This discussion paper set out to reflect other sources than those sponsored by the Moldovan government to cover the EU-Moldova Action Plan (EUMAP) issue, attempting to present to the public a rather new perspective addressing the progress and failures of the Moldovan Government in the course of implementing the EUMAP.
The initial publication of this paper coincides with an important period, namely the termination of the implementation period of the EUMAP. Even though the term ended in February 2008, the Plan will undoubtedly continue to serve as a reference point in the political dialogue between EU and Moldova over the next few years. It should be noted, however, that recent discussions on whether the Action Plan was successfully implemented or not generated more disagreement than consensus between authorities and civil society, as well as between the governing party and opposition parties.
Disagreements over the progress of the Action Plan are even more surprising given that many of its objectives and tools were initially met with enthusiasm by major stakeholders in Moldova. During the final phase of the Plan implementation. rhetorical clashes between national actors, particularly between central authorities and civil society, increased. The latter has criticised the government for poor performance during these three years of EUMAP implementation. All sorts of such debates have provided valuable insight for analysis, comparison and reflection over the invoked reasons.
The plot thickened due to the fact that even European institutions and certain European partners of official Chisinău have repeatedly expressed their concerns in regard to the Plan, pointing out serious gaps in its implementation.
This paper, while assessing as objective the existing criticisms of the poor performance showed by the Moldovan Government in the implementation of the Action Plan, is aiming also to expose the roots of the problem and to identify solutions. It shares the widely accepted opinion that it is the Moldovan political leadership, and especially the country’s political system built by it, which is to a very large extent responsible for the failures of the EUMAP.
At the same time this paper also shares the view that only blaming central authorities for their incompetence and inefficiency does not provide viable solutions. Unconstructive and indiscriminate accusations may only encourage those opposition actions that may lead to street demonstrations calling for regime change, which is undesirable in a democratic system that relies on elections to determine political leadership. On the other hand, political turmoil is not exactly what Moldova would need in order to advance on its democratic
transition path. In other words, this paper assesses existing obstacles and seeks possible solutions without promoting or supporting partisan interests.
The paper concludes that the Moldovan leadership deliberately does not allow for some elements of the EUMAP to progress. Moreover, it disguises this lack of will to implement certain reforms set out in the Action Plan through simulating institutional activity and efficiency, by mimicking certain processes, or even publicly denying that any problems exist at all.
Another important obstacle in the process of Moldova’s European integration is the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Although in a way it sounds like a conspiracy theory, and it is categorically rejected by some opposition members who perceive it as a poor excuse for the current government’s mistakes, the paper insists that Russia is a factor that cannot be ignored in the existing political context. Further, the most recent criticism of the Communist government raised by domestic stakeholders provides some recommendations regarding this issue; however these mostly answer the “what” question and very unconvincingly the ”how” one.
The study analyzes the character of methods Russia employs to resist and obstruct Moldova’s European integration efforts and looks into the possibility of improving this situation. In our view a possible solution to this problem is to keep the bilateral relations with Russia as transparent as possible, making it an important topic of public discussion; and to create a strong institutional balance. As a result, Russia will not be able to develop and use different pressure mechanisms on individual Moldovan politicians, transforming their
individual interests and vulnerabilities into the country’s vulnerabilities, since the decision power of these politicians will be checked and balanced by other branches of the state power. It will also bring Moldovan central authorities to the recognition of the “curative” role of European partners’ influence, with the EUMAP project contributing to the democratic modernisation of the state and the society.
Surprisingly, instead of providing certain grounds for public policy debates and assisting the government this study reaches the conclusion that the core of the problem lies in the very character of the Moldovan governance. Such a finding alters the scope of the paper, which therefore addresses not only the political decision-makers, but also the civil society as a whole. It specifically targets the foreign partners involved in development and democratisation work in Moldova, the academia and private sector, - namely all actors who are interested in the success of the Action Plan goals, aimed at addressing democratic transition challenges that Chisinău faces. This study reveals the need for change in the approaches and strategies employed by the foreign organisations working in the field of economic and political development in Moldova.