Stojić notes that:

• The largest migrant crisis in Europe since the Second World War has seriously undermined the already fragile interstate relations in the Western Balkans.
• One of the busiest borders in the region between Serbia and Croatia was reopened after a five-day blockade that culminated in a ban on entry of Serbian citizens to Croatia.
• Instead of being actively involved in resolving the dispute, the EU kept quiet for days until the closure of the border started affecting the regional ailing economies and their delicate political stability.

Stojić writes that this crisis also highlights the “need for a new mechanism of permanent and close communication between these states that are obviously unable to cope individually with the complex global challenges that will continue to affect them in the future.”

An English-language translation of the post can be read on the EUROPEUM website here.

The post Migrants in the ‘No Man’s Land’ and the Western Balkans in the ‘Twilight Zone’ first appeared on PAS OS.

“In Ukraine, a British exit from the EU would become a significant gift to the political forces which, in harmony with Russian propaganda, have spent years trying to discredit the EU in the eyes of Ukrainians and have been inspiring people to hate everything European,” according to Getmanchuk, who wrote the article for  the London School of Economics’ EUROPP website.

“If the British vote for a withdrawal, they will take away from Ukraine one of the most important arguments for the EU: that there are lots of countries queuing to enter, while there is no country that wants to leave.”

Getmanchuck’s commentary was included as part of a survey of experts on the impact of the United Kingdom possibly leaving the EU, and in light of British demands that the country’s status in the union be renegotiated and plans on holding a referendum on membership.

The full article can be read online here.

The post Brexit Would Damage Ukrainian Hopes for a European Future first appeared on PAS OS.

“However, this will need to be achieved without comprising the basic foundations of the European integration project,” Bartovic states in the article, written for the London School of Economics’ EUROPP website.

“Czechs will definitely support British demands for enhancing the single market, especially in the area of services, the digital market, and energy, as these are also priorities for the Czech government.

“The Czech Republic has always promoted elimination of trade barriers, thus the government will support British any demands for a quick completion of trade deals with the US and other big economies.”

Bartovic’s commentary was included as part of a survey of experts on the impact of the United Kingdom possibly leaving the EU, and in light of British demands that the country’s status in the union be renegotiated and plans on holding a referendum on membership.

The full article and commentary can be read online here.

The post Czech Republic: A Desire to Accommodate British Demands, but Without Treaty Changes first appeared on PAS OS.

The majority of refugees are actually economic migrants? 

It is a common misconception that refugees are predominantly economic migrants. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, without citing credible sources, has claimed that 95% of all refugees are economic migrants. Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s Prime Minister, has echoed this statement, claiming that the “overwhelming majority” of migrants in Europe are not refugees.

This is factually wrong.

According to the UN, 62% of all migrants reaching Europe by boat this year were from Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan, all countries suffering from war, dictatorial oppression and/or religious extremism, meaning these people almost always have the legal right to refuge in Europe. Adding refugees from parts of Nigeria, Darfur, Iraq and Somalia, the percentage of legitimate refugees become far higher. It is a myth that the majority of migrants are economic migrants.

The distinction between migrant and refugee matters greatly; under the 1951 Refugee Convention and a plethora of EU laws, European countries are obliged to offer refuge or protection to asylum seekers who can verify they are fleeing war or persecution. In the case of economic migrants looking to increase their prospects, even if they left behind lives of poverty, the European countries are under no obligations to accept them.

Several Czech politicians have echoed the sentiments by Orbán and Fico, President Zeman and Andrej Babis most vocally and notably. Yet as the abovestated numbers prove, the premise of Fico and Orban’s claims, namely that Europe’s migration crisis amounts largely to a problem of border management and repatriation rather than relocation and integration, is flawed.

The infrastructure, social and integration systems in European countries cannot cope with the number of refugees?
The EU boasts a total population of more than 500 million people. The UN has estimated that 850.000 refugees will be arriving in Europe in 2015 and 2016. This is little more than 0.1% total population increase. Although this estimate is conservative and likely to be exceeded, the amount of refugees would still be miniscule and manageable, as not everyone arriving in Europe will be eligible for asylum.

Furthermore, considering the disproportionate amount of refugees taken in by countries such as Germany and Sweden, the spread of refugees is incredibly uneven across Europe. The coming refugee quotas will do little to change this. The 4306 refugees the Czech Republic is set to take will constitute a population increase of 0.04%. Considering the Czech Republic’s lack of refugee intake in the past several years, the argument that refugees constitute a cultural threat or unsustainable burden economically and on the country’s social system is unfounded fearmongering.

Europe does not need immigrants?

Europe desperately needs immigrants. A demographic deficit looms above Europe; simply put, too few babies are born to sustain the social security systems underpinning most contemporary European states and ensuring the caretaking of its elderly population. The Guardian recently described this development as a “perfect demographic storm that will imperil economic growth across the continent.”

To use Germany as an example, it is expected that at its current rate, Germany’s population will, according to the German government, by 2060 be reduced from 81 million people to 67 million people. According to the European Commission’s statistics, the Czech Republic’s fertility rate is marginally higher than Germany’s yet still below the EU average. To put it into the context of the Czech Republic, a comparable fall in population would have a devastating impact on the country’s economy and social and health care systems.

Sweden is one of the countries who are most proactive in averting this calamity. In the words of Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, “[…] it [the refugee crisis] is a major challenge at the moment, but it is also an asset”, citing the necessity of integrating refugees in order to avert future demographic disaster.
The alternative to integrating refugees is most often cited as ’controlled immigration’. However, in the case of the V4 countries, controlled immigration on a sufficient scale as a solution to this challenge is an illusion; the V4 countries are one of the poorer regions of the EU, already suffering from high levels of (economic) emigration (the very thing V4 politicians accuse legitimate refugees of doing, paradoxically) to Western countries. Compounded by a rising xenophobia, the V4 countries are hardly attractive countries for a skilled laborer compared to Scandinavian or Western European countries, who all suffer from similar demographic developments.

The post Three Myths About Refugees, Immigrants and the European Refugee Crisis first appeared on PAS OS.

Published on the website of Transitions Online (TOL), the article is subtitled “As he leaves the stage, many wonder how the passionate reformer gave way to the reviled megalomaniac.” TOS is a nonprofit organization established to strengthen the professionalism, independence and impact of the news media in the post-communist countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Tarkhan-Mouravi’ analysis details a phenomenon that all too often afflict reformists who succeed despotic regimes:

“But the concentration of power in the hands of the small circle of “revolutionaries,” and in Saakashvili’s hands in particular, came with a heavy price. For all of the achievements of their first years in power, the president and his coterie inherited many of the vices of the old government – intolerance of opposition, conceit, complacency, impulsive and irrational decision-making, imitation of democratic practices, little real dialogue with civil society and the people, and, ultimately, a loss of touch with reality.“

The post The Dramatic Rise and Fall of Mikheil Saakashvili first appeared on PAS OS.

The elections turned out to be remarkably predictable for most observers. Lukashenka won 83.5% of the vote, whereas his rivals managed less than 5% each. The “against everyone” candidate came second, and Tacciana Karatkievič was ranked third.

The scenario was usual: the Central Election Commission sang “Winner Takes it All” to the backing track prepared well in advance, and international monitors noted timid progress compared to the previous presidential election of 2010; however, they seemed to believe neither in the fairness of the procedure nor the outcomes. The only question is why the authorities needed a victory with so many special effects — substantiating the 83.5% share of the vote is a lot harder, than, say, 60%, a much more believable figure.

There are a few reasons for this. The first one is banal: the Belarusian regime has never made concessions on its own accord, always leaving enough room for maneuver in case there is no other option but compliance. Lukashenka won a landslide victory with 83.5% of the vote, because even with that proportion he was able to get what he actually did get.

The second factor is the momentum: winning the next elections with a score that is substantially lower than that achieved previously would show that the incumbent has become less popular.

Third, such a result allows making no changes to the political system: the authorities do not have to co-opt counter-elites citing their non-existence (less than 5% of the vote cast for the alternative candidates is too low a level to begin speaking about any representation of any influential group).

In addition, the regime had apparently focused on demonstrating the utmost unity of the nation in the face of the economic crisis. The authorities must be aware of the real situation in the economy better than anyone else and realize that they will not do without unpopular measures. This is happening not because Lukashenka made up his mind to put in place structural reforms (the very word “reforms” is more of an abusive term for him — this is what the era of the early 1990s is normally referred to, which deprived people of their savings and helped him snatch power from his opponents in the nomenklatura, which survived the collapse of the Soviet Union). By analogy with civil aviation, according to the air crew, as soon as Belarus flies into a turbulence zone, the Belarusians must not only fasten their seatbelts, but also constantly applaud the crew. The result is that it creates a sort of illusion of safety: the pilots will believe that they have their passengers’ trust, and passengers will believe that the crew knows where to fly and how to land.

Fourth, judging by the votes cast for Tacciana Karatkievič, the regime does not see the point in establishing the façade democracy by promoting the party system and encouraging the emergence of the systemic opposition in the parliament. Interestingly, the opposition split into two groups during the election campaign. The first one was led by Tacciana Karatkievič — that group wished to become the “systemic opposition,” in other words, to play the opposition role within the framework of the existing regime and seek changes in some state policies without calling for the change of the regime itself, or at least without voicing this intention. The second group includes the non-systemic opposition, whose goal has been and still remains the change of the regime. There was no consensus in the second group, either: Liabiedzka and Kaliakin attempted to collect signatures, but having failed, they started convincing society, together with Niakliajeŭ and Statkievič, that “ignore” was the best possible strategy to fight Lukashenka (they never managed to explain the difference between the notions of “ignore” and “boycott” and never made it clear how their tactics would win them the elections). The systemic opposition (which, incidentally, never became systemic per se), hastily receded from the non-systemic opposition, while the non-systemic opposition refused to have anything to do with the “systemic” opposition, but never dared call for people to come to the Square.

Overall, despite the moderate and constructive rhetoric during her election campaign, Tacciana Karatkievič was shown her real place in Belarusian politics, as she was ranked third after the candidate named “against everyone.” This result will obviously be insufficient for Karatkievič and the Tell the Truth! campaign to qualify for a spot in the political system as a mouthpiece for the dissenting minority. However, a niche may still appear in the new layout for the constructive “opposition to His Majesty” (by analogy with medieval Britain), provided that the regime embarks on reforms and senses the need for sharing its responsibility for the painful aftermath of those reforms with someone who wanted the reforms so badly. Having this logic in mind, Karatkievič’s team can hope to have not only its representatives in the parliament, but also its members appointed to some insignificant positions within the state administration: the regime will hardly have arguments against free services by kamikaze volunteers.

Fifth, the Belarusian leadership must have relied on the scenario, according to which the European Union and the West as a whole would continue pursuing the policy of normalization of their relationships with Belarus, given the international situation, whatever the number of votes that the incumbent president was going to get, because it is Lukashenka that is the guarantor of stability in the country (against the backdrop of Ukrainian instability) and neutrality concerning the Ukrainian crisis. The main thing that Brussels is now concerned about is the absence of repression against the opposition in Belarus, because it will create a negative picture in western media and, consequently, lead to increased pressure of public opinion on decision-makers. This is why Minsk was doing its best to avoid any incidents on the ballot day and tolerated unsanctioned activities by the opposition ahead of the election day.

The outcomes of the elections and data submitted by independent monitors suggest that the final report by the OSCE ODIHR mission, which underlies the EU’s evaluation of the elections, will be unfavorable — the elections will be announced to have fallen short of democratic standards of the OSCE. Such a conclusion can be drawn even based upon preliminary statements by international monitors made at a news conference on 12 October. However, it is quite likely that, just as in 2008, the report will mention certain progress, which, alongside the recent release of political prisoners, will give the EU a reason to suspend sanctions against Belarusian officials and enterprises and continue the normalization process, in which both sides are interested at this stage.

In addition to the Ukrainian factor and the new “cold war” between the West and Russia, important reasons for the EU to seek improvement in its relations with Minsk include the understanding of the ineffectiveness of its previous attempts to democratize Belarus from the outside, as well as the weakness of the Belarusian opposition as a political player, on which the EU could otherwise rely on in its policy on Belarus. Therefore, Brussels opted for expanding contacts and areas for cooperation with the Belarusian government — the only decision-making entity in Belarus. This is also evidenced by the sharp reduction in financial support for opposition organizations and groups.

Meanwhile, one should not expect the newly reelected president to implement large-scale structural reforms, contrary to what the West would like to see in Belarus. Minsk perceives structural reforms as a political threat, rather than an instrument to address economic challenges. Therefore, sporadic point transformations will be a lot likelier in the areas, which cannot do without changes (such as loss-making enterprises), and where such modifications will have no political impact on the authorities. The process may take many years and will largely depend on the external economic situation and willingness of Russia to keep the amount of its support for Belarus unchanged.

The post Elections–2015: An Illusion of Unity Before Reforms Start? first appeared on PAS OS.

Jermanová’s piece was written in the wake of the announcement that this year’s Nobel Peace Prize had been awarded to four Tunisian civil society organisations, often call “The Quartet.”

“It was the national dialogue, brokered by the Quartet, that helped to overcome political deadlock, and for that the prize is well-deserved,” Jermanová writes. “Yet Tunisians are still having a hard time coping with some of the country’s most persistent socio-economic problems.”

“The Tunisians that I met saw their fellow countrymen receiving the Nobel Peace Prize as a time for reflection. And they agree that another revolution is yet to come.”

Read the full article at Politics Reconsidered here.

The post The Nobel Peace Prize Reminds Tunisians of the Limits of Their Revolution first appeared on PAS OS.